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PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
OF FELONY BAIL PROCESSES. By Roy B. Flemming. New York:

Longman. 1982. Pp. xiv, 175. $20.
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Given the constitutionally required presumption of innocence, 1 American pre-trial detention policies depend for their justification on the need to
assure the appearance of the accused at trial. For many judges setting bail
for a defendant they believe likely to commit additional crimes pending
trial, this justification is surely a fiction. And regardless of the reason, confinement or enforced expense amount to punishment. In the context of the
bail system, Roy Flemming refers to this phenomenon as "punishment
before trial" (p. 2).
The application of this "punishment," however, varies greatly among
jurisdictions. Flemming's Punishment Before Trial· An Organization Perspective ofFelony Bail Processes attempts to explain why bail policies differ
so markedly from court to court. By focusing on the decision-making process and the contextual or environmental factors that influence bail decisions, Flemming has developed an organizational theory that explains why
courts make the bail choices they do. No other commentator has explained
the variation in bail policies so completely.2
At the outset, Flemming notes that the scope and severity of punishment
before trial varies widely in American courts (pp. 4-5). He reinforces this
observation by presenting the results of an empirical study of two specific
court systems, Detroit and Baltimore. Flemming examined the initial bail
decisions for fifteen hundred felony defendants in each city in 1972 (p. 6).
Detroit emerged as a "less punitive" city, releasing al1I1ost fifty percent of its
felony defendants on their own recognizance. In contrast, Baltimore's court
followed a substantially stricter bail policy. Only twelve percent of the total
number of defendants received recognizance releases and in those cases in
which a money bail was set, it was significantly higher.than bail amounts
set in Detroit for equivalent offenses (p. 9). Flemming seeks to explain
these differences with an organizational theory of court behavior.
Chapter two presents the conceptual framework for this theory. Flemming examines the processes by which courts make bail decisions. He distinguishes between "routine" and "situational" choice modes (pp. 30-33).
A "routine" bail choice· involves a brief disposition, based exclusively on
the defendant's prior record and the nature of the alleged offense. The defendant plays no part in the proceedings. Courts with lighter caseloads,
however, will tend to make their bail determinations pursuant to the "situational" mode, in which the defendant enjoys a participatory role. The
l. J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 (1979).
2. See, e.g., R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965);
J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE (1979); R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (1966); W. THOMAS,
BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976); B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF
PRETRIAL RELEASE (1974).
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judge or court officer will question the defendant and consider the truthfulness of his responses in rendering the bail disposition.
While central to an understanding of how an individual court might
function in setting bail for a particular defendant, this discussion of the
decision-making process contributes little toward the goal of Flemming's
work, which is to explain the differences in bail policy between Detroit and
Baltimore and to show how changes in bail policies might be brought
about. To understand why bail policies differed so greatly in the two cities,
Flemming states that the context in which the bail decisions were made
must be scrutinized (pp. 19-27). The environment in which a court makes
its bail determinations is the most important determinant of the strictness or
leniency of its policies. Within this notion of context, the author examines
the factors of uncertainty, risk, and resources and notes their effects on the
formulation of bail policy.
Even though a rational organization attempts to avoid uncertainty in its
decision-making, "[u]ncertainty is intrinsic to the task of making bail decisions" (p. 19). Uncertainty can manifest itself in various ways. For example, if the court faces a defendant about whom it has limited information,
classification of the defendant as either "good" or "bad" involves an extremely uncertain determination. Misclassification of a defendant as
"good" results in the possibility that the defendant may not appear for trial
or may commit a crime while free. Because courts act to avoid uncertainty,
courts with limited information tend to detain defendants before trial to
reduce the possibility of uncertain outcomes.
Flemming also believes that risk plays a major role in bail decisions (pp.
21-23). The public may scold or even sanction a judge or court official for
making a bail decision that "backfired." An elected official even runs the
risk of defeat at the polls for his bail decisions. Thus, those who make bail
determinations attempt to minimize the risk of sanctions by adhering to
public political sentiment.
Flemming also views resources - especially the detention capacity of
jails - as a critical factor influencing bail policy {pp. 24-27). Without the
facilities to hold pretrial detainees, punishment before trial could not exist.
Conversely, excess jail capacity permits courts to pursue more restrictive
bail policies, detaining a greater percentage of defendants awaiting trial.
This examination of the contextual factors that influence bail decisions
is the most significant contribution of Flemming's study. Differing contexts
explain the differing bail policies in the two subject cities. It is important
for attorneys to know that while the particular defendant and the accusations against him will influence the bail determination, the overall possibilities for release depend upon the political and institutional context in which
the court acts. Flemming's model illustrates that bail decisions are substantially the result of factors beyond the courts' control; therefore, attorneys
may be powerless to win favorable dispositions for their clients. Because the
extent of pretrial sanctioning is so dependent on the existing political climate, Flemming confirms that political power is critical to effectuate bail
reform.
After developing his organizational theory, Flemming uses it to explain
the differing bail policies existing in Detroit and Baltimore in 1972. Despite
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Detroit's high crime rate dating back to the 1967 riots, the Detroit courts
engaged in a surprisingly low amount of pretrial detainment (pp. 42-73).
One of the explanations Flemming offers for this phenomenon is Detroit's
political climate in 1972 (pp. 43-53). The court system had committed
grave injustices against accused criminals during the riots. Most of these
felony defendants were black. As the black population gained political effectiveness, it expressed its dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system.
Since the judges who made the bail decisions were elected officials, they
responded to public pressure for the increased use of recognizance releases.
Detention resources also played a significant, if not the preeminent, role
in shaping Detroit's bail policies. Overcrowded jails (p. 63) sparked public
pressure to alleviate the inhumane conditions (p. 66). When a Circuit
Court decision placed a legal maximum on the jails' population, affirmative
steps had to be taken to alleviate overcrowding. The Detroit courts were
forced to adopt a bail policy which freely utilized recognizance releases (p.
68).
In contrast, stringent bail policies characterized the Baltimore courts
(pp. 76-114). This is curious because Baltimore possessed one of the country's most permissive bail rules. 3 Flemming makes the important discovery
that bail reform does not necessarily liberalize the conditions of release (pp.
80-83). Change is impossible without the requisite political power. Baltimore's conservative political climate superseded the statutory reforms and
prevented change (pp. 77-78). Both the public and police were leery of defendants out on bail because two police officers had recently been killed by
released defendants (p. 80). Further, the commissioners who made the bail
decisions were extremely vulnerable to both criticism and dismissal by their
superiors; thus, the commissioners were inclined to be strict with defendants
and minimize the risks associated with making the wrong decision (pp. 8386). In sum, the environment surrounding the Baltimore courts in 1972 did
not permit a lenient bail policy.
Despite this contribution to the study of bail, Flemming's work is not
free of defects. First, his heavy reliance on statistical data is often confusing.4 Readers lacking some background in statistics may find the terminology and the significance of various tables and figures hard to follow. Also,
long discussions often lead to obvious ccnclusions. For example, Flemming
states that ''the scope of pretrial punishment narrows as the frequency of
recognizance releases increases." Similarly, after a lengthy discussion,
Flemming concludes that the amount of a cash bail is directly related to the
severity of the charge. Neither of these observations merits the attention the
author pays them. Finally, Flemming's use of ten-year-old data is bothersome and taints the credibility of his results. It is difficult to authenticate
3. Rule 777: "Any defendant charged with an offense not punishable by death shall, at his
appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance unless the officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the defendant as required." This rule carried a presumption that felony defendants would
be released on their own recognizance. P. 8.
4. See, e.g., p. 10 (utilizing "multiple correlation coefficients" to compare the severity of
punishment in Detroit and Baltimore courts).
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his explanations of the significant environmental influences facing the
courts.
In the end, however, the problems are small compared to the task undertaken. Flemming provides perceptive analysis of an integral part of the
criminal justice system. For the undertaking - as well as the results - he
deserves praise.

